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The Vulnerability of Technological Culture∗ 
  
Wiebe E. Bijker 
 
 
The attacks on New York and Washington, 11 September 2001 (‘9/11’), as well as 
other attacks since, have demonstrated how vulnerable our modern societies are.1 
These events shattered many people’s basic feelings of security and safeness, though 
9/11 probably did not radically change the view of scholars in science, technology, 
and society studies (STS). Work on this chapter started in response to 9/11, when 
several historians and sociologists of technology and science asked in what ways their 
research could be relevant to understand these events.2 I will argue that it is worth to 
investigate the vulnerability of technological culture, and that this can be done 
fruitfully from an STS perspective. My main point, however, is different. I want to 
suggest that vulnerability is not to be taken as something purely negative. Living in a 
technological culture, I will argue, inevitably implies to live in a vulnerable world. 
And vulnerability is not only an inevitable characteristic; it is even an important asset 
of our technological culture as a prerequisite for living with the quest for innovation. 
To live in an open, changing and innovative culture, we must pay the price of 
vulnerability.  
Vulnerability is a central issue when thinking about innovation. Joseph 
Schumpeter’s recognition that the fundamental instability of capitalism presents an 
ever-present possibility of entrepreneurs’ seizing upon innovations can be read as an 
early formulation of a positive relation. Vulnerability seems to be a condition sine qua 
non for innovation, as it is the inevitable result of the instability and dynamic 
development that Schumpeter identified as prerequisites for innovation (Schumpeter 
1939). The relation has also been made vice versa: innovation makes vulnerable. 
                                                 
∗ This is a manuscript. See for final publication: Bijker, W. E. (2006). The 
Vulnerability of Technological Culture. Cultures of Technology and the Quest 
for Innovation. H. Nowotny. New York, Berghahn Books: 52-69. 
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Patent law, for example, is one way of coping with the financial vulnerability that 
results from the large investments required for innovation.  
In this chapter I want to explore the vulnerability of technological culture: a 
vulnerability that is at the same time an inevitable consequence of, and a necessary 
prerequisite for, the advanced technological society in which we live. To do so, I shall 
first specify what it means to investigate technological culture in addition to analysing 
technological systems and high-tech society, and then continue with an analysis the 
concept of vulnerability applied to, respectively, systems, society, and culture. 
Studying Technological Culture 
As Helga Nowotny observes in her Introduction, “to approach technology under a 
cultural perspective is (…) both self-evident and highly demanding.”3 Such an 
approach is self-evident, because “technology is perceived as the most consequential 
cultural practice that humankind has developed;” and it is demanding, because “the 
risks associated with technologies have revealed themselves to be a cultural 
phenomenon as well.” To analyse the various types of vulnerability of technological 
systems and societies, it is thus necessary to use a cultural perspective; it is necessary 
to analyse technological culture. 
This focus on technological culture is part of a more general trend in STS. In 
the 1970’s and 1980’s the focus was on case studies of scientific controversies and on 
technological artefacts and systems. In the 1990’s, this agenda broadened to also 
address social, political, and cultural issues of societal relevance (Bowker and Star 
1999, Edwards 1996, Hecht 1998). Accordingly, the empirical base was broadened as 
well: the attention to science was extended to a variety of belief systems such as 
indigenous knowledge (Verran 2001, Watson-Verran and Turnbull 1995), and 
knowledge developed by patient groups (Epstein 1996); the attention to technology 
was extended to social technologies, and to technologies’ users (Oudshoorn and Pinch 
2003). The STS research agenda now also includes such issues as democratisation, 
(scientific) expertise, politics of genomics, and the relation between economic 
development and technological knowledge (Callon et al. 2001, Wilde et al. 2002, Bal 
et al. 2002, Gottweis 1998, Mokyr 2002). In other words, developments in the last 
decade have shown a shift from the study of the (local) cultures of science and 
technology to the study of technological culture at large.  
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Why use the phrase ‘technological culture’? One reason is to highlight the 
pervasiveness of science and technology in modern, highly developed societies. As 
John Law and I summarized in 1992:“All relations should be seen as both social and 
technical (…). Purely social relations are found only in the imaginations of 
sociologists, among baboons, or possibly, just possibly, on nudist beaches; and purely 
technical relations are found only in the wilder reaches of science fiction.” (Law and 
Bijker 1992: 290). To conceptualise society as a combination of merely social systems 
and technological systems, does not adequately recognise this pervasiveness. To take, 
in contrast, ‘technological culture’ as the key focus of research helps to recognize “the 
basic, underlying assumption that modern societies are predominantly shaped by 
knowledge and technology”.4 Studying technological culture, then, means to study 
technologies and societies from a cultural perspective: the unit of analysis is a 
technological system or a (part of) modern, technology dominated society, and these 
are studied with specific attention to the cultural dimensions. A focus on technological 
culture highlights how social interaction is mediated through technologies, and how 
technologies can only function when embedded in societal institutions.  
This usage of the term ‘technological culture’ is thus broader and more 
ambitious than the way it is used in the context of public understanding of science: 
there it is synonymous with ‘technical literacy’ and often connected to economic 
development and innovation.5 The term ‘technological culture’ in its broader sense is 
in line with Manuel Castells’ move to extend the analysis of the network society to an 
analysis of identity, democracy, power, and international relations (Castells 1996 
(2000), Castells 1997, Castells 1998 (2000)). It is equally in line with recent work in 
philosophy that recognizes “that the characteristic traits of our culture are pervasively 
and irrevocably technological”, and that all current public debates “involve 
perceptions of technology in its widest and most comprehensive sense, which is to say 
technology as our culture”.6 
I will now review in more detail what it means to study the vulnerability of 
technological systems and high-tech societies from a cultural perspective, and then 
summarize these findings by discussing the vulnerability of technological culture. 
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Vulnerable systems 
Technological systems can be vulnerable, as is abundantly clear from a long list of 
accidents and accompanying scholarly treatises (Schlager 1994). Charles Perrow 
argued already in 1984 that in modern societies, with their large, complex, and tightly 
coupled technological systems, accidents are ‘normal’ (Perrow 1999 (1984)). Recent 
STS literature covers, for example, the Challenger disaster (Vaughan 1996), the 
Bhopal chemical plant explosion (Fortun 2001), aviation accidents (Wackers and 
Kørte 2003, Snook 2000, Rochlin 1991, La Porte 1988), and nuclear accidents 
(Rochlin 1994).   
The common meaning of vulnerable is ‘sensitive to being hurt or wounded,’ 
and often it is applied to ecosystems or living beings. Associated connotations are: 
defenceless, unprepared, weak, and naked. Vulnerable, then, seems to describe an 
intrinsic characteristic of a being or system, quite independently of the system’s 
concrete context. It is more fruitful, however, to analyse vulnerability as a relational 
concept. Writing about natural hazards, Piers Blaikie et al. offer a relational and active 
definition of vulnerability: the reduced “capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and 
recover from the impact of a natural hazard.” (Blaikie et al. 1994: 9). Sometimes 
associated to this active meaning is also a more positive connotation of being 
vulnerable: lowering your defences, exposing your weak spots, showing your Achilles 
heel—which can be an expression of strength and superiority rather than weakness. In 
this section I will investigate these aspects—relational, active, and partly positive—by 
further developing the concept of vulnerability in connection to technical systems. I 
will do so in four steps. 
 Analysing the vulnerability of technical systems, Ger Wackers and Jens Kørte 
unpack this reduced capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from threats, 
and they translate it into a reduced capability to maintain functional integration. 
Without such functional integrity, systems stop working; loss of functional integrity 
for living beings means death (Wackers and Kørte 2003). This amounts to my first 
step towards specifying vulnerability. With this concept of (the loss of) functional 
integration, Wackers and Kørte analyse the vulnerability of an offshore helicopter 
transport system. They show how the helicopter system drifted (i.e. imperceptibly 
changed) towards a more vulnerable state in which various elements worked at a sub-
optimal level and in which seemingly practical adaptations of the prescribed protocols 
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resulted in an increased vulnerability of the system. The concept ‘drift’ has been used 
by a variety of authors, but Wackers and Kørte particularly draw on Scott Snook’s 
analysis of the 1991 shoot-down of two UN peacekeeping helicopters, full of officials, 
in northern Irak, by two US fighters (Snook 2000). Snook describes how a ‘practical 
drift’ of local adaptations and procedures led to a steadily widening gap between the 
safety regulations and the practical operations of fighters, helicopters, and AWACS 
controllers. Individually these adaptations were inconsequential, but over a longer 
period this practical drift had resulted in a vulnerable system—the system had lost 
some of its functionality because the various sub-systems did not collaborate and 
integrate as they were intended to. 
 What exactly could we mean with the term ‘vulnerable system’? Charles 
Perrow’s analysis of normal accidents in large (technical) systems is the classic 
starting point to answer that question. Perrow’s diagnosis is that large technical 
systems are more risky, and tend to run into more catastrophic accidents, when they 
are more complex and more tightly coupled. Complex systems—in contrast to linear 
systems—have many interconnected subsystems, with many feedback loops, and 
multiple and interacting controls. Examples are universities and nuclear plants. 
Tightly coupled—in contrast to loosely coupled—systems do not allow for delays in 
processing, follow one invariant sequence of processing steps, have little slack in 
supplies and personnel, and have few and built-in buffers and redundancies. Examples 
are hydropower dams and nuclear plants. Aircraft systems and nuclear plants are 
complex and tightly coupled systems. Using Perrow’s analysis it is now possible to 
make a second step towards specifying the vulnerability of systems. A tightly coupled 
complex system is more vulnerable in two ways: (1) it is more risky in Perrow’s sense 
of failing due to some internal component errors, and (2) it is less capable to 
anticipate, cope with, and recover from the impact of external disturbances which do 
not fit its pre-conceived lines of reaction. In other words, a loosely coupled system is 
less vulnerable in both senses because there is less chance that internal errors will 
proliferate through the system, and because there is more opportunity (in the form of 
buffers, time, and extra redundancies) to react to external disturbances. And a linear 
system can be more easily protected—and thus made less vulnerable—because it 
typically is spatially segregated, allows for easy substitutions of sub-systems and 
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components, has single purpose controls and few feedback loops, and often is better 
understood. 
The work by Perrow, Snook, Wackers and Kørte shows how crucial it is to 
analyse these events at a combination of individual, group, and systems levels. Diane 
Vaughan adds—and that is my third step—group culture and organisational culture to 
those perspectives. She recognizes the Challenger disaster as a normal accident, but 
“this case extends Perrow’s notion of system to include aspects of both environment 
and organisation that affect the risk assessment process and decision making.” 
Technical experts’ interpretation “of the signals is subject to errors shaped by a still-
wider system that includes history, competition, scarcity, bureaucratic procedures, 
power, rules and norms, hierarchy, culture, and patterns of information” (Vaughan 
1996: 415). Perrow criticizes, in his afterword to the 1999 publication of his 1984 
book, Vaughan’s focus on work group culture and safety, because she “ask[s] how we 
can make risky systems with catastrophic potential more safe, a question that takes for 
granted that they must run hotter, be bigger, be more toxic, and make super demands 
upon members.” In addition, Perrow wants to raise the issue of power, and “the role 
of production pressures in increasingly privatised and deregulated systems that can 
evade scrutiny and accountability.” (Perrow 1999 (1984): 379) I agree with Perrow’s 
foregrounding of political choice about specific technologies and about ways of 
organising society, but I think he misses the key point of Vaughan’s cultural analysis. 
Vaughan’s analysis does not dismiss, I think, the importance of issues of politics and 
power, but it casts them in a different light. 
 This will form my fourth step in developing the concept of systems’ 
vulnerability: Diane Vaughan links her cultural analysis explicitly to the social 
constructivist notion of interpretative flexibility (Bijker 1995b): “The ambiguity of the 
engineering craft is complicated by ‘interpretative flexibility.’ Not only do various 
tests of the same phenomenon produce differing results, but also the findings of a 
single test are open to more than one interpretation” (Vaughan 1996: 202). And “even 
the same results could be interpreted differently. Sometimes disagreements between 
the two communities were hard to settle because, as one long-time Marshall S&E 
representative put it, contractor working engineers tended to be ‘defensive about their 
design’ because they believed in their own methods and analysis.” (Vaughan 1996: 
87) The implication of this insight is that the vulnerability of systems cannot be 
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characterised in objective, context-independent terms. Vulnerability, I want to argue, 
is socially constructed as much as facts and artefacts are (Pinch and Bijker 1984).  
To elaborate this argument, it is helpful to first consider the related concept of 
risk. The vulnerability of systems, and particularly the vulnerability due to possible 
internal errors and failures, can to some extent be described in terms of risks. The 
Health Council of the Netherlands defines risk as “the possibility (with some degree 
of probability) that damage (with a specific character and size) will occur to health, 
ecology, or goods.” (Gezondheidsraad 1995: 14) (my translation). This is a 
deliberately broad definition, allowing for a variety of forms of damage: varying, for 
example, in character, magnitude, timing, and possibility to recover. It is broader than 
the definition that forms the basis for probabilistic risk analysis: the probability of a 
(damaging) event multiplied by its magnitude. The broadness of the Health Council’s 
definition implies a form of risk analysis and management that recognizes that “risk is 
more than a number”—the title of another Health Council report (Gezondheidsraad 
1996). This latter report recognises that risks are the consequences of human action, 
whether we consider nuclear energy production, chemical plants, air travelling, living 
below sea level, or smoking. Such human action is always aimed at some kind of 
profit or benefit. It is therefore necessary to assess risks and benefits within one 
framework: risks cannot be evaluated without also evaluating the positive effects of 
the actions that generate them. Additionally, the Health Council concludes that risk 
problems may vary fundamentally, depending on: the extent of the risk over time; its 
extent through space; the uncertainty about its extent, character and magnitude; and 
the societal relevance of the risk inducing action. All these considerations lead to the 
conclusion that the often-used distinction between objective risk and risk perception 
does not hold. Risks cannot be conceptualised as an objective, quantifiable, context-
independent phenomenon; and it makes no sense either to talk of the perception of 
such objective risks (Asselt 2000).  
Now I can specify the relation between vulnerability and risk. Vulnerability 
refers to a system's condition—to its ability to anticipate, resist, cope with, and 
possibly recover from events that could reduce the systems functional integrity. Risk, 
on the other hand, is an outcome-oriented notion. It conceptualises the effects of a 
possible, harmful event. Vulnerability, by itself, is not related to any other outcome 
than the breakdown of the system itself. A vulnerable system may yield certain risks, 
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when it could produce damage, depending on the circumstances. A risk analysis can, 
vice versa, be helpful in assessing a system’s vulnerability: analysing the chances (and 
resulting damage) of sub-system or component failure may help to get to grips with at 
least the technical aspects of a system’s vulnerability.  
Let us now finish the fourth step—the constructivist turn—in developing a 
concept of vulnerability. The first move was Vaughan’s recognition of the 
interpretative flexibility of claims about a system’s characteristics and performance. 
The second move was to recognize that even risks are ‘more than numbers’, and 
indeed context and culture dependent. To complete this constructivist turn with a third 
move, I will draw on John Law’s paper about the London Ladbroke Grove train 
disaster (Law 2003). In this tragic accident, in which 31 people died and 414 were 
injured, a three-carriage diesel train unit and a high speed train collided at Ladbroke 
Grove, two miles outside Paddington Station, on 5th October 1999. Using an actor-
network analysis, Law produces a detailed description of the relevant system, 
including the train units, the signalling, the drivers’ training programmes, the industry 
management, and the safety regulations and technologies. Law’s analysis tells us how 
all elements of the network—people as well as technologies—were geared towards 
maintaining and improving safety. But he also shows how small changes in standard 
arrangements cumulatively may have ‘drifted’ to this disaster. There is a crucial 
difference, however, between Snook’s handling of the concept of practical drift and 
Law’s conclusion about the role of small disorders that led to the Ladbroke Grove 
disaster.  
Law highlights that “the partial disorder of these not very coherent 
arrangements does just fine a good deal if not all of the time. (…) For every case of a 
Ladbroke Grove there are endless ‘system breakdowns’ that have no serious 
consequences.” He shows, with detailed analysis of the use of the Driver Reminder 
Appliance (DRA) on the diesel train (which I cannot reproduce here), that the same 
measurement that strengthens the system and makes it less vulnerable in one set of 
circumstances, does exactly the opposite under other circumstances and then enhances 
the system’s vulnerability. So, these measurements, technical devices, and regulations 
show interpretative flexibility: in one condition they improve safety, in another they 
increase vulnerability.  
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Even more crucial for my constructivist conception of vulnerability, Law 
argues, “there are endless system failures that help to keep the wheels turning.” Law’s 
argument here is an argument about imperfection: about its unavoidability, and about 
the advantages of practising imperfection. That is how complex systems have 
developed over time: practices and routines have developed in safety-critical contexts 
because they proved workable, and they thus yielded a relatively stable and 
invulnerable system. And some of these practices are incoherent, unruly, against 
narrowly interpreted safety regulations. Such unruly practices are the lubricant to keep 
a system going, to make a system less vulnerable by better coping with potential 
hazards. The conclusion, then, can only be that vulnerability is socially constructed: 
the same system can be deemed relatively invulnerable—when unruly behavior is 
interpreted as people taking their responsibility, using their experience, improvising to 
accommodate to changing conditions; or it is deemed vulnerable—when such 
unruliness is defined as violating the regulations and creating risky situations.  
Let me summarize my cultural analysis of the vulnerability of technological 
systems. The vulnerability of a technological system describes the weakness of that 
system’s capacity to maintain functional integrity. System vulnerability is linked to 
the performance of sub-systems, system components, and to routines and working 
practices. Hence, risk analysis on component level can be helpful to assess a system’s 
vulnerability. Practical drift may lead a system gradually to more vulnerable states, 
without the practitioners noticing in time. Vulnerability is a constructivist concept in 
the sense that it does not describe a context-independent and intrinsic quality of the 
system. Like the sociology of knowledge has shown for scientific statements, also 
vulnerability will be contested when it is at the forefront of debate, controversy, or 
research. This is not to say that all is merely ‘in the eye of the beholder’, or that there 
is no real base to vulnerability. Let me adapt the following metaphor, used the Harry 
Collins to illustrate the constructed nature of scientific knowledge: vulnerability and 
system are like map and landscape—vulnerability does relate to the reality of the 
system, but is not fully determined by it.7  
Vulnerable societies 
Technical systems function in societies. Modern, high-tech societies are indeed built 
on, with, around, and in technological systems. Any failure of those technical systems, 
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therefore, would directly impinge upon society. Vulnerable technical systems lead to a 
vulnerable technical society. The concept of vulnerability, as developed in the 
previous section, is fully applicable to societies—from its focus on functional 
integrity to its constructed nature.  
When we describe our societies as vulnerable for a terrorist attack, we mean 
that there is a chance that such an attack will cause key institutions of society to stop 
functioning and the social fabric of society to disintegrate. In this diagnosis of 
vulnerability, technology plays a key role. The western societies are more vulnerable, 
because they are high-tech societies. It is exactly because such key institutions as 
energy distribution, communication, transportation, and trade are so complex and 
tightly coupled, that a high-tech society built around those institutions is so 
vulnerable. Most of these technological systems and social institutions have existed in 
some form already for a long time, but the complex and coupled character is new. As 
Perrow observes: “Odysseus’ vessel neither polluted the Mediterranean shoreline nor 
could destroy much of Texas City; the World War II bombers could not crash into a 
building holding nuclear weapons (…); chemical plants were not as large, as close to 
communities, or processing such explosive and toxic chemicals; airliners were not as 
big, numerous, or proximate to such large communities; and it is only recently that the 
risk of radiation from a nuclear plant accident has been visited upon almost every 
densely populated section of our country.” (Perrow 1999 (1984): 307) Damage may 
come from within or from outside the technical systems; damage may come in the 
form of technical errors and accidents, or in the form of social disruptions—but in all 
cases the complex and tightly coupled character of high-tech institutions potentially 
increases the devastating effect of the damage.  
But the opposite is also true. Western societies have never been so well 
defended against natural disasters as with the current dike systems and earthquake 
proof buildings. Surveillance technology, intelligence, information systems, and 
biometrical technologies for person identification defend the USA against intruders. 
Modern medical technologies have increased public health to unprecedented levels. 
Our western societies are less vulnerable because of the technical systems that are 
employed. This seemingly contradictory diagnosis—that technology makes modern 
societies more vulnerable, while at the same time making societies more safe—would 
of course only be a problem for an essentialist concept of vulnerability: a society is 
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‘really’ vulnerable to some degree. The constructivist concept of vulnerability that I 
proposed in the previous section recognizes that a society can be constructed by 
certain actors, with certain aims, and under certain conditions, into being vulnerable; 
while the same society can be argued to be relatively invulnerable in another context 
or from another perspective.  
 Some of the recent work on vulnerability, often spurred by the terrorists’ 
attacks, does mirror this dual character of technological societies. Apart from the 
recent attention to help citizens prepare themselves against terrorist attacks, much of 
the vulnerability related discussions and activities have focused on infrastructure 
(Blaikie et al. 1994) (Branscomb 2002). Often this was in the context of natural 
disasters such as floods and earthquakes. Recently the infrastructure of the Internet 
increasingly receives attention, and in all these different senses: as a potentially 
vulnerable infrastructure of modern society, as an infrastructure that can strengthen 
society’s capacity to react to threats, and even as an infrastructure that can be turned 
into a weapon for attacks on society.8  
 To connect the notion of vulnerability with the survival of nations is of course 
something that has been done frequently since 9/11, and especially in the USA. 
Significantly, the word ‘vulnerable’ is hardly ever used in the documents and websites 
of the new US Department of Homeland Security, but it arguably is the most central 
concept behind this office’s actions and policies. Vulnerability to ‘biological, 
chemical, and radiation threats, and explosions and nuclear blasts’ is cited as the main 
reason to ‘be ready’, ‘be informed’, ‘make a plan’, and ‘make a kit of emergency 
supplies’.9 Of course, among specialists (but now I am referring to army and weapon 
specialists rather than STS scholars) “the vulnerabilities in the United States to attacks 
by international terrorist or domestic groups or by such groups with domestic-
international linkages” had been recognised long before (Sloan 1995:5). The emphasis 
was on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons: “The proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and associated technologies, and the diffusion of knowledge needed to 
manufacture chemical and biological weapons, raises the fearful specter of mass 
destruction that makes concerns related to use of anthrax as a way of spreading both 
disease and panic pale to insignificance. The scary truth is that the United States is all 
too vulnerable to this kind of attack. (…) Highly symbolic targets like government 
buildings and corporate headquarters will be more vulnerable to attack.” (Sloan 
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1995:7) These accounts, comments, and policies exemplify the constructed nature of 
vulnerability: they create one particular form of vulnerability, linked to one particular 
identity of the American society. Other American societies exist, and other accounts 
of vulnerability and resilience can be constructed accordingly, as I will show below. 
Thus the concept of vulnerability as it was developed above is also applicable 
to societies. It may need some extension however.  There are some issues that play a 
role when discussing the vulnerability of society, which are not prominent in 
discussing technological systems. The Netherlands Health Council explicitly 
concludes from its diagnosis that risk is more than a number: “Questions of risk 
management are questions about the configuration of society. Opinions about the 
vulnerability of nature, about the care for future generations, and about the freedom to 
act—they all shape the answers to these questions.” (Gezondheidsraad 1996: 20) 
These are issues that relate to the core cultural values of a society. Perrow also notes 
the difficulty to handle such questions with the quantifying mathematical risk models 
that dominate the field of probabilistic risk analysis: this “is a narrow field, cramped 
by the monetarization of social good. Everything can be bought; if it cannot be bought 
it does not enter the sophisticated calculations. A life is worth roughly $300,000 (…); 
less if you are over sixty, even less if you are otherwise enfeebled.” (Perrow 1999 
(1984): 308)  
A second element needs to be added to complete this section on vulnerable 
societies. This second element concerns the role of science. In his analysis of modern 
society as a ‘risk society’, Ulrich Beck identified the crucially new role that science 
plays in the vulnerability of modern high-tech societies (although he does not use the 
word ‘vulnerable’): “If we were previously concerned with externally caused dangers 
(from the gods or nature), the historically novel quality of today’s risks derives from 
internal decision. They depend on a simultaneously scientific and social construction. 
Science is one of the causes, the medium of definition, and the source of solutions to 
risks”. (Beck 1992: 155) (italics in original). Beck’s analysis gives an important 
reflexive twist to the conception of vulnerability as I developed sofar. The 
vulnerability of society is not merely a result from the growth of technological 
systems in number, size, complexity and tightly coupled nature, as Perrow would have 
it. Beck conceives the risks, accidents, and—I would add—vulnerability of modern 
society, as the inevitable result of the modernization process itself. The result of this 
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process is that the old industrial society is being replaced by a new risk society, Beck 
argues, in which social conflicts are less about the distribution of wealth but rather 
about the distribution of risks.   
The Vulnerability of Technological Culture 
In the previous sections I have reviewed various conceptions of vulnerability, when 
applied to technical systems and to societies, and I have done so from a cultural 
perspective. Let me now take stock of what this analysis has given us, by focusing on 
technological culture itself. As mentioned previously, my conception of technological 
culture is meant to highlight, that characteristic traits of our culture are pervasively 
and irrevocably technological; that our technologies are thoroughly cultural; that we 
can only understand our modern, high-tech society by recognizing how its dominant 
cultural values and its technology shape each other. A study of technological culture 
complements an analysis of technological society, because such a study focuses on the 
cultural values, identities, and practices that underpin the social institutions in these 
societies.  
Vulnerability depends, ultimately, on values. The crudest example is a culture 
that does not value human lives—such a culture would be much less vulnerable to 
risks that may cause casualties, or to terrorist attacks that aim at killing people. 
Cultural values vary widely over historical time and across geographical space. The 
experience and the concept of vulnerability vary accordingly. It is trivial to note that 
over the past century an increase in hygienic conditions has decreased the human 
vulnerability to diseases, in the rich world; it is equally trivial to observe that the 
vulnerability of individual humans is very different depending on where you live. 
Social, economic, and health conditions are so different in Africa, as compared to 
richer parts of the world, that vulnerability must have a completely different meaning 
there. As legal philosopher Judith Shklar argues: “what is regarded as controllable and 
social, is often a matter of technology and of ideology or interpretation. The 
perceptions of victims and of those who, however remotely, might be victimizers, 
tend to be quite different.” (Shklar 1990: 1) Shklar builds her analysis of vulnerability 
and victimhood, of misfortune and injustice, on the observation that “the difference 
between misfortune and injustice frequently involves our willingness and our capacity 
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to act or not to act on behalf of the victims, to blame or to absolve, to help, mitigate, 
and compensate, or to just turn away.” (Shklar 1990: 2) 
Differences in vulnerability between various geographic regions may also be 
caused by political circumstances and power relations. For example, both Palestinians 
and Israelis feel vulnerable, but the character of their experience of vulnerability 
seems to be quite different. In a paper for the summit of ACP10 Heads of State, Fei 
Tevi extends vulnerability to the economic and social, and wants to ”define 
vulnerability with regards to the environment, the economy and the society in the 
Pacific region.”11 The basis for this extension was laid at the UNCED Conference of 
1992 in Rio de Janeiro, when “the small island developing states were recognised as a 
special case for environment and development under Agenda 21 because of their 
vulnerability, fragility, small size, geographic dispersion and isolation.”12 To 
recognise this vulnerability is simply a matter of survival, Tevi argues. Using 
Wackers’ and Kørte’s concepts, we can now specify this ‘survival’: it is aimed at 
maintaining functional integrity as a community, as an economy, and as a people. 
Survival and vulnerability thus relate here to sustainability—sustainability in terms of 
energy and material cycles, and in terms of existential security. 
The historical variability of vulnerability, as well as vulnerability being value-
laden, is nicely illustrated by discussion about what should be listed as cultural 
heritage that needs protection. For example, the historical value of fortifications from 
World War II, that were built by the German occupation army in the Netherlands, 
were declared cultural heritage. Such a decision preserved these buildings by 
declaring them vulnerable and worthy of protection—although concrete fortifications 
are normally not thought of as being vulnerable.  
The risk of epidemics like SARS can be explained in Perrow’s terms, but the 
urgent sense of vulnerability it created in 2003 can only be described by referring to a 
dominant idea of complete health that exists in our technological culture. A SARS 
epidemic certainly can be analysed as a complex system with elements such as the 
selling and handling of livestock (chicken, civet cats) for consumption on crowded 
market places; the slaughtering of the animals in homes with subsequent exposure of 
humans to blood and entrails; increasing likelihood of new viruses emerging through 
recombination of chicken viruses and human influenza viruses; and the increased 
mobility of human bodies through a few hub airports (Singapore, Hong Kong). The 
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public impact of the 2003 SARS epidemic—also in countries in the western world 
where few casualties occurred—did, however, not result from citizens doing such a 
risk analysis. The epidemic had such an impact and created such an acute sense of 
vulnerability, because many in the richer parts of the world thought that infectious 
diseases were banned or confined to specific groups of people and types of behaviour 
(as in the case of AIDS).  
If vulnerability is an inevitable characteristic of technological culture, as I 
think it is, how then do technological cultures handle this vulnerability? Surely all 
engineering routines, scientific methods, and managerial strategies, which we 
reviewed in the context of technical systems and societies, play a role. But what can 
be identified at the level of technological culture? I think that the precautionary 
approach is at least a partial answer to this question. With a precautionary approach, 
technological cultures can find ways to live with their vulnerability without 
necessarily violating their fundamental values.  
The probably most cited version of the precautionary principle is the one in the 
Rio declaration: “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation”. (U. Nations 1992) This implies a 
shift from prevention of clear and manifest dangers towards precautionary action to 
avoid hypothetical risks: this principle allows interfering, even when it is not clear 
what the risk exactly is. A wealth of literature has developed since, that translates this 
principle in various precautionary approaches (Klinke and Renn 2002, EEA 2001). 
What is important for my purposes here is that some versions of a precautionary 
approach not only propose ways of handling risks, but also explicitly cite core values 
of modern technological cultures. For example, Sue Mayer and Andy Stirling argue 
that their approach “acknowledges the complexity and variability of the real world and 
embodies a certain humility about scientific procedures and knowledge.” (Mayer and 
Stirling 2002: 60) (italics in original)  
These values will not necessarily be the same in all proclaimed precautionary 
approaches, nor will the implementation of specific values be uncontroversial and 
without costs. Henk van den Belt and Bart Gremmen cite Aaron Wildavski (1995), 
when they warn “against the illusionary belief that by adhering to the Precautionary 
Principle something valuable, to wit human or environmental health, could be got at 
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virtually no cost whatsoever, the facile assumption being that the proposed bans and 
regulations themselves would have no adverse health effects.” (Belt and Gremmen 
2002: 107) The interpretation and implementation of the precautionary principle 
inevitably will vary, according to the legal and scientific doctrines, and to the 
openness of the political culture.  
Thus the particular implementation of the precautionary principle allows 
shaping a technological culture in a specific way. It also connects back to my opening 
remarks, in which I connected vulnerability to innovation. Implementing the 
precautionary principle forms a battleground for stimulating or restricting innovation. 
Critics of the precautionary principle are afraid that it will curtail innovation. “The 
reason is that it leads its protagonists to focus mainly on the possibility that new 
technologies may pose theoretical risks, always hedging against the worst possible 
outcomes by assuming worst case scenarios, while ignoring the potential benefits of 
these same technologies or the real existing risks that could be mitigated or eliminated 
by them.” (Belt and Gremmen 2002: 106-107) The report by the European 
Environment Agency in which twelve cases of the use of the precautionary principle 
were reviewed, also links precaution to the recognition that we live in a changing 
world while having limited knowledge: “a key element in a precautionary approach to 
regulation involves a greater willingness to acknowledge the possibility of surprise. 
This does not mean resorting to blanket opposition to innovation.” (EEA 2001:169) 
A final way of tracing the meaning of vulnerability is to ask what would be its 
opposite. Countering vulnerability may be phrased as aiming at ‘safeness’ or 
‘security.’ Clearly, the choice of words when formulating the goal of offering an 
alternative to the vulnerability of society is not innocent: safe society, secure society, 
guarded society, or resilient society—these terms yield different values and political 
strategies. Conceptions of vulnerability fall in two classes, depending on whether their 
opposite has a connotation of control (such as in security) or flexibility (such as in 
resilience). Examples of control-oriented reaction to vulnerability are stricter 
immigration rules, and administration and control technologies that have been 
installed in the US recently.13 As various organizations have argued, on the long run 
this may hamper the development of knowledge and cross-cultural understanding 
among different international communities—and thus possibly increasing the 
vulnerability of the US in the sense of not being able to react flexibly to threats.14  
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An example of flexibility-oriented defense against vulnerability is to maintain 
of a variety of crops and means of living, rather than to concentrate on one economic 
activity. Imagine a village at Lake Victoria in Africa, where developmental aid has 
improved fishing technologies that offer increased control to the fishermen because, 
for example, they are less vulnerable to bad weather conditions. An unintended 
consequence, then, may be that farming activities become relatively less profitable, 
thus inducing people to abandon the traditional mix of economic activities. This then 
would make the village less flexible in reacting to changes in world market prices for 
fish and crops—making the village more vulnerable in that other sense. 
The European Environmental Agency also links its discussion of the 
precautionary principle to flexibility. It recognizes that our technological cultures are 
in a state of ‘societal ignorance’ on many important issues that relate to technological 
and scientific developments. This societal ignorance is contrasted to ‘institutional 
ignorance’—referring to a situation where information relevant to a decision is extant 
in society, but not available to the decision makers—which can be remedied by 
provisions for more effective communication and social learning. The “condition of 
societal ignorance is more intractable. This problem (…) requires rather different 
remedies, involving scientific research and the fostering of greater diversity, 
adaptability and flexibility in decision-making and technological choices.” (EEA 
2001: 171) 
Not only vulnerability in the form of the occurrence of technological accidents 
and natural disasters, but also the associated experiences of misfortune or injustice are 
inextricably linked to the accomplishments of our technological culture: “Our 
technological expectations are often too high, but given what the last two generations 
have accomplished, we suspect wrongful indifference or injustice when there is no 
one to protect us against the still-untamed forces of nature. In fact, it is not the fault of 
scientists or public officials that little can now be done, nor are they culpably 
indifferent to the current epidemic. Victims, however, seem to find it easier to bear 
their misfortune if they can see injustice as well as bad luck.” (Shklar 1990: 65)  With 
a focus on vulnerability of technological culture we do not only study the fragile 
constitution of modern societies, but can also capture the fragility that is constitutive 
of our technological culture and thus of its core structures and values.  
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Rather than treating vulnerability as something to be avoided, repaired, and 
fought—as something that is an implicit and unquestioned starting point of action as 
in the case of the current US policies I mentioned previously—I propose to treat 
vulnerability with the intellectual respect it deserves.15 Whatever the current general 
obsession with safety and security may be, we will never be in a state of complete 
invulnerability. Indeed, I would not wish to live in such a society. Studying the 
vulnerability of technological culture may thus help us to understand our current 
highly developed societies.  
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Endnotes 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 This paper is the result of numerous discussions with many people. I want to thank 
Wes Shrum, Rosalind Williams, Steve Rayner, and Steve Woolgar. I also benefited 
greatly from the comments by participants in the March 2002 Workshop at MIT (see 
note 4); the conference ‘Cultures of Technology and the Quest for Innovation’ in 
Essen, April 2003; the STS colloquium in Maastricht, May 2003; and a seminar at the 
Said Business School, Oxford University, June 2003. Special thanks for a discussion 
of the previous draft go to Karin Bijsterveld, Helga Nowotny, Ger Wackers, and Rein 
de Wilde. 
2 A workshop in March 2002, at the STS Program of MIT, provided a first inventory 
and discussion of the implications that 9/11 might have for studying technology in 
society (Levin and Williams 2003). To locate this research on vulnerability within 
current STS work, I will give more references than would be necessary for the 
vulnerability issue itself. 
3 Did this sentence indeed make it from the conference programme to the book 
introduction?  
4 This is the characterization that Michael Guggenheim and Helga Nowotny give of 
what distinguishes STS from other social sciences (Guggenheim and Nowotny 2003: 
241). 
5 See for example Godin (2000). I first used the phrase ‘technological culture’ in my 
inaugural lecture: Bijker (1995a), in Dutch. See also Bijker (1995b).  
6 Italics in the original: Hickman (2001: 1-3). See also Keulartz et al. (2002, 2004). 
7 A similar constructivist account of vulnerability is discussed by Kristin Shrader-
Frechette (1991). In these risk discussions, however, a contrast is created between the 
‘constructivist camp’ and the ‘realist camp’ of risk assessment. I do not agree with 
that distinction because the underlying suggestion is that scientific data is more real 
that other information (Klinke and Renn 2002). 
8 The literature on the vulnerability of computers and the Internet is huge and still 
increasing, including complete journals and on-line databases. The use of Internet and 
computers for warfare and terrorism has been labelled ‘cyberwar’ or ‘netwar’; see 
Arquilla (2001).  
9 See the website of the US Department of Homeland Security: http://www.ready.gov/ 
(12-1-2004). 
10 The developmental policy of the European Union is particularly targeted at the ACP 
countries: African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries. 
11 Fei Tevi, “Vulnerability: A Pacific Reality”, Summit of ACP Heads of State and 
Government (Libreville, Gabon, 6-7 November 1997): 1. 
12 Fei Tevi, “Vulnerability: A Pacific Reality”, Summit of ACP Heads of State and 
Government (Libreville, Gabon, 6-7 November 1997): 14. 
13 See the report by an ad hoc committee of the Society for Social Studies of Science, 
chaired by Gary Downey:  “U.S. Visa Policies and Scholarly Work”, Committee on 
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Immigration Policy and Scholarly Work, Society for Social Studies of Science, 
February 2003. 
14 See for example the chapter by M.R.C. Greenwood, chancellor of the University of 
California (Greenwood 2002); and the Statement from Bruce Alberts, President of the 
US National Academy of Sciences, Wm. A. Wulf, President of US National Academy 
of Engineering, and Harvey Fineberg, President of the US Institute of Medicine: 
‘Current Visa Restrictions Interfere with U.S. Science and Engineering Contributions 
to Important National Needs’, 13 December 2002 (Revised 13 June 2003).  
15 I am inspired here by Shklar’s plea “to treat injustice with the intellectual respect it 
deserves.” (Shklar 1990: 17).  
